This study demonstrates the impact of systematic risk on the prices of individual equity options. The option prices are characterized by the level and slope of implied volatility curves, and the systematic risk is measured as the proportion of systematic variance in the total variance. Using daily option quotes on the S&P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks, we show that, after controlling for the underlying asset's total risk, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. Thus, systematic risk proportion can help differentiate the price structure across individual equity options. 
and Whaley (2004) appealed to the demand-based arguments in resolving the different structures in option prices. Motivating their arguments based on limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Liu and Longstaff, 2004) , they showed that the extent of imbalance in demand and supply could determine the level and the slope of the implied volatility curve.
Thus, the differential price structures among individual equity options is attributed to the different extents of imbalance. As we will argue later, their model doesn't answer why net buying or selling pressure exists. Therefore, the framework is more effective in explaining the steeper slope of the index options' implied volatility curve (due to net, excess demand of out-of-the-money put options for insurance purposes), but less so in differentiating the price structures of individual equity options. In contrast, our systematic-risk-based explanation is clear-cut and applies to all options.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the hypotheses and testing procedures, and reports the main results. Various robustness checks are documented in Section 2. Section 3 explores potential theoretical reconciliations of the empirical findings. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Empirical relation between systematic risk and the structure of option prices
According to the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing theory, option prices do not depend on how much systematic risk is contained in the underlying asset as long as its total risk is fixed. When the option prices are converted into implied volatilities, they should not be related to the proportion of systematic risk relative to the total risk. Therefore, we have the following two null hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: The implied volatility level of the options is unrelated to the systematic risk proportion of the underlying asset.
• Hypothesis 2: The slope of the implied volatility smile/smirk curve of the options is unrelated to the systematic risk proportion of the underlying asset.
As mentioned earlier, many empirical studies (e.g., Bates, 2000; Buraschi and Jackwerth, 2001 ; and Jones, 2006) indicate the existence of systematic risk factors (such as jumps and volatility risk) in option prices. These systematic risk factors become part of the pricing kernel, and how much they account for the total risk will obviously impact the characteristics of the risk-neutral distribution. Therefore, our alternative hypotheses are: 1) both the level and the slope of the implied volatility curve will depend on the systematic risk and 2) the amount of systematic risk will differentiate the price structures of individual equity options.
The most natural definition for the systematic risk proportion, denoted as b j , is the ratio of the systematic variance over the total variance. The logical variables representing the option price structures are the level and slope of the implied volatility. As in BKM (2003) and other studies, working with implied volatilities facilitates comparisons across option strikes and maturities for the same stock as well as comparisons across options on different stocks.
We will show as part of the preliminary tests why the systematic risk proportion is the appropriate metric to use. Here, we offer one theoretical motivation for the two hypotheses, with an emphasis on the importance of b j . The key building blocks are from BKM (2003), and our specific arguments are provided in Appendix A. Assuming a one-factor model with a normally distributed idiosyncratic error term under the risk-neutral measure, the following relation for a given maturity is obtained: Clearly, the implied volatility is related to the systematic risk proportion of the underlying asset, and the degree to which it is related depends on the moneyness of the option. As long as the market return is skewed and/or leptokurtic, the level and slope of the implied volatility curve will be related to the systematic risk proportion. More significantly, the measure of the systematic risk for this purpose is not the absolute amount or beta; rather, it is the relative proportion.
Several empirical issues need to be sorted out before we proceed to the tests. To begin, how do we estimate the average volatility, or the overall level of total risk? Since we use the Black-Scholes implied volatility to characterize the option price structure, it is natural to use some version of the historical volatility to proxy the future average volatility. The key issue is how far back we should go in the estimation. Balancing between estimation efficiency from a larger sample and the relatively shorter options maturities, we opt for a one-year (250 days) rolling window. Specifically, we run daily, one-year rolling-window, OLS regressions in (9) for stock j and estimate the systematic risk proportion as . If we need a measure of systematic risk proportion for a period of, say, four weeks, the daily estimates are averaged.
In our study, we first average the daily variances over the period, and then calculate b j .
Another issue is the empirical characterization of the implied volatility curve. BKM To test our hypotheses, we follow BKM (2003) and perform the Fama-MacBeth (1973) type two-pass regressions. We need to obtain time series of estimates for the level and slope of the implied volatility curve, which are used to run the cross-sectional regressions to determine whether they are related to the systematic risk proportion. The cross-sectional regression is repeated for non-overlapping periods and the average regression coefficients are used to test the hypotheses.
While a weekly, non-overlapping window in the first-pass regressions provides a sufficient number of observations in the study by BKM (2003), we must increase the window length because the option data have been further divided into four moneyness buckets. Thus, we adopt a window of one month (four weeks), and the second-pass regression is performed on a monthly basis. 1 The calculation of the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis is based on the results in BKM (2003) , and the procedure is briefly outlined in Appendix B.
With this in mind, we proceed with hypothesis testing. In the first-pass regression, for each stock and moneyness bucket, we lump all the observations in a four-week period and repeat the following regression for the j-th stock:
for 65 times (260 weeks divided by 4). In the above, I j is the number of options in a particular moneyness bucket for the j-th stock, y jk = K jk /S jk andȳ j is the sample average of y jk .The intercept α 0j and regression coefficient a 1j are measures of the level and the slope of the implied volatility, after adjusting for the j-th stock's total risk, σ his j .
2 1 Even with a window of four weeks, some stocks in certain buckets still have too few observations for the time-series regressions. To ensure that regressions are based on a reasonable sample size, we have set a minimum of ten observations in both the time-series and the cross-section regressions. The screening criterion for cross-section regressions is not binding most of the time. 2 Historical volatility for the j-th stock is actually day-specific. The time subscript is omitted to simplify notation. We subtract the historical volatility from the implied in order to control for the difference in total risk across stocks. Moreover, the moneyness variable y jk is adjusted by its mean to ensure that the intercept α 0j is the average difference between the implied and the historical volatilities.
In the second pass, we perform three versions of cross-section regressions using the intercept from the first-pass regressions as the dependent variable: for j = 1, 2, · · · , 31,
The time-series of the regression coefficients, 65 in total, are then averaged and its corresponding t-statistic is calculated using the Newey-West standard error with three lags
is an unconditional test of Hypothesis 1, which should not be rejected if γ 1 = 0. Regression (5) is a conditional test of Hypothesis 1, controlling for the effects of the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis, and we should obtain γ 1 = 0 if the systematic risk proportion exerts no effect once the influence of risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis is considered. Regression (4) is performed purely for comparison purposes.
To test Hypothesis 2, we simply repeat the regressions in (3), (4) and (5) by using the slope a 1j from the first-pass regression as the dependent variable.
To ensure that our results are not due to the two-pass testing procedure, we will also perform a one-pass panel regression to test the two hypotheses. Moreover, we will control for some firm-specific characteristics.
Data summary and preliminary investigations
The option data used in this study are identical to those in BKM (2003), covering options written on the S&P 100 index and its 30 largest component stocks. Please see Appendix C for details.
Tables 1A and 1B report summary statistics. To see the general association between the stocks' key characteristics and the systematic risk proportion, we sort the stocks into quintiles by their systematic risk proportions and calculate the average value of the characteristic variables for each quintile. The variables we examine are the ones used for later tests, namely: 1) the average implied volatility minus the average historical volatility; 2) the average slope of the implied volatility curve;
3) the average risk-neutral skewness; and 4) the average risk-neutral kurtosis. Since the last two quantities do not change across moneyness, we only divide the sample into maturity buckets. Given the magnitude of the S&P 100 index's systematic risk proportion, we put it in a separate group, the fifth quintile. The first quintile contains six stocks and the other three contain eight stocks each. The sorting is done monthly, and the average values are calculated for each quintile. We then average the monthly quantities for each quintile over 65 months. It should not be surprising that beta is not a good measure of systematic risk for our purpose. Our hypotheses focus on the amount of systematic risk given the amount of total risk. A higher beta doesn't always mean that the systematic risk accounts for most of the total risk. By the same token, equal betas don't mean equal systematic risk proportions. Finally, we perform a diagnostic check. Intuition would suggest that the systematic risk proportion may potentially be a proxy for the total volatility, especially for large stocks.
To check if this is the case, we regress the total volatility (implied or historical) on the systematic risk proportion across the 30 stocks. The R 2 is 0.49% and 6.74% respectively, and the t-value for the regression coefficient is −0.372 and −1.422 respectively. Therefore, the total volatility and systematic risk proportion are unrelated.
Level effect tests
We now proceed to the formal tests. The regression results also offer some other interesting insights. First of all, judging by the magnitude and t-value of the regression coefficient γ 1 as well as the percentage of positive entries, we see that the effect of systematic risk proportion itself also takes a smirk pattern across moneyness. The effect is much stronger for the lower moneyness buckets. As the exercise price becomes higher, the level effect becomes weaker. This is consistent with the pattern of the implied volatilities.
Second, in terms of maturities, it is clear that the effect is stronger for short-term options (20 -70 days), and it becomes weaker as the maturity gets longer. This is true for both the unconditional and conditional tests.
Finally, in both the unconditional and conditional tests, the coefficients for the riskneutral skewness and kurtosis are mostly insignificant and the signs are mixed. Nevertheless, as shown in Panel B, the effect of the systematic risk proportion on the implied volatility level remains significant, even after controlling for the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. Table 3 , albeit slightly weaker, in terms of rejecting the hypothesis. For most parts, the slope of the implied volatility curve is related to the systematic risk proportion in a statistically significant fashion. The bigger the systematic risk proportion, the steeper the slope. The significance largely remains after controlling for the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected.
Slope effect tests
Other observations regarding moneyness and maturity are also similar to those in Table   3 . The weakening of the systematic risk effect on the slope is especially pronounced with the upper tail of the moneyness range, i.e., 1.05 -1.10. This is due to the slight curving back of the implied volatility curve in this region. As for maturity, we also observe a weaker effect with long-term options.
BKM (2003) predicted positive coefficients for the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis in describing the slope of implied volatilities. We do observe positive (and sometimes significant) γ 2 and γ 3 for many cases, but the signs are by no means uniform across the moneyness buckets. When we combine the moneyness buckets and run a single regression as in BKM (2003), we do obtain the sign and significance as shown in BKM (2003) . This implies that it is very crucial to separate moneyness buckets when examining the properties of the implied volatility.
In terms of economic significance, the R 2 is lower than its level effect counterpart. For the univariate regressions covering all maturities, the systematic risk proportions explain 4.7%, 4.8%, 5.5% and 1.6% of the cross-sectional variations in the slope for the four moneyness buckets respectively. The numbers improve to 18.8%, 16.7%, 17.9% and 12.8% when the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis are added to the regressions.
A combined test of the level and slope effects using panel regressions
To make sure that our conclusions are not due to the two-pass testing procedure, we run a single-pass panel regression and test the two hypotheses therein. Specifically, we run the following panel regression for each moneyness/maturity bucket:
whereb i is the observation-weighted, cross-sectional average of the systematic risk proportion for each day,ȳ j is the sample average of moneyness for stock j within the bucket. Broadly speaking, α 0 can be understood as the average differential between the implied volatility and the historical volatility over all names within the entire sample period. Similarly, β 0 can be understood as the average slope of the implied volatility curve. They are not exactly the said quantities due to the interaction term b ij * y ij . would imply that a stock with a higher than average systematic risk proportion will have a slope steeper than the average slope of all implied volatility curves. Table 5 reports the results. Based on the t-values of the coefficient α 1 , Hypothesis 1 is rejected at an extraordinary level of significance, reaffirming the level effect. As for the coefficient β 1 , except for three cases, the t-values are significant and large. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected, confirming the slope effect. If anything, the panel regressions lead to a stronger rejection of the two hypotheses than did our two-pass regression tests. We have also repeated the tests by calculatingb i as the simple average of the systematic risk proportions (i.e., not weighted by the number of observations). The results remain almost identical.
volatility and beta since they are already the subjects of our study. The trading pressure variable is not included because we do not have data on options' trading volumes, and this variable turned out to be insignificant in Dennis and Mayhew (2002) . We rerun the panel regression in (6) by adding the three control variables. We exclude the index in the tests because the control variables are available for the individual firms but not for the index. To ensure meaningful comparisons, we first rerun the panel regression in (6) without the index. 2 Robustness checks
Alternative ways of calculating and estimating the systematic risk proportion
Recall that the monthly systematic risk proportion, b j , is calculated by using the average systematic and total risks within the four-week period. To see if our testing results are sensitive to how b j is calculated, we repeat the tests by using the average b 0 j s within the four-week period. In other words, we first calculate the daily proportions and then average them to obtain a single estimate for the four-week period. The results remain virtually the same, for both the two-pass regressions and the panel regressions. We have also repeated the tests by using
The results are slightly weaker, but the statistical significance is retained in most cases. There is an intuitive justification for using the variance ratio rather than the standard deviation ratio. After all, variance is the natural measure of risk since it is additive for independent risks.
Another potential concern has to do with the estimation of the historical volatility and its composition, which employs a one-year rolling window with daily frequency. The shorter window and higher data frequency raise the concern that the resulting risk estimates may be highly time-varying and do not necessarily reflect changes in the systematic risk proportion.
To address this concern, we repeat the tests using a five-year rolling window at weekly frequency (by sampling data points on Wednesdays). For both the level effect and the slope effect tests, the statistical significance remains, albeit some t-values decrease slightly.
Systematic risk estimation using Fama-French factors
So far, all the tests use systematic risk estimates from a single factor model, the market model. We now re-estimate the systematic risk by adding the two Fama-French factors,
i.e., SMB and HML, to the market factor. By definition, the systematic risk proportion estimated with the two additional factors will be higher. The question is, Will it increase proportionally across stocks so that our level and slope effects would hold up? To answer this question, we repeat the tests using the newly estimated systematic risk proportions. Since the panel regression results are stronger, to be conservative, we show the two-pass regression results. To conserve space, we report the test results for the level and slope effects in one table, Table 7 . For brevity, we only report the regression coefficient and its t-value together with the R 2 for the univariate regression (with the systematic risk proportion being the only explanatory variable) and the multivariate regression (with the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis as well as the systematic risk proportion as the explanatory variables).
Comparing Table 7 with Table 3 (level effect) and Table 4 (slope effect), we see that the results remain virtually the same. This is another indirect support for the choice of the systematic risk proportion over the beta for our study. Since we have controlled for the overall level of risk, what matters is the composition of the total risk, not the absolute magnitude of the components. As long as the same estimation procedure is applied to all stocks, the cross-sectional feature would manifest itself. Therefore, one may also infer that our results are likely robust to more sophisticated estimation methods, e.g., a Bayesian shrinkage estimator or certain type of optimal estimator, for the systematic risk.
We have also conducted robustness checks on sub-samples and the influence of the index.
For the former, the results remain for the two equal-half samples; for the latter, after removing all index options, the significance remains for the level effect tests, and weakens for the slope effect tests. All said, our results are robust to various alternative specifications.
3 Reconciliation with the existing literature
As discussed in the introduction, our study offers an alternative explanation to the observed difference in price structures across equity options. the empirical regularities are ultimately due to a wedge driven between the physical and risk-neutral distributions of the underlying. This wedge is in turn caused by the entry of the risk premium into the second and/or higher moments of the risk-neutral distribution.
In other words, as long as the additional risk factors are systematic or priced, they would influence option prices and determine the features of the risk-neutral distribution.
To check the above assertion, we regress the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis on the systematic risk proportion. That is, we run the following cross-section regressions,
on a monthly basis as in Section 1 and calculate the average regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics using Newey-West standard errors. For the risk-neutral skewness, we findγ 0 = −0.615 with a t-value of −13.001 andγ 1 = −0.921 with a t-value of −9.117. This result indicates that the risk-neutral return distributions are on average negatively skewed and the degree of the negative skewness is proportional to the systematic risk proportion.
Our regression results for the risk-neutral kurtosis areγ 0 = 3.294 with a t-value of 46.890 andγ 2 = 2.032 with a t-value of 4.531. This finding suggests that the stocks in our sample have on average leptokurtic risk-neutral return distributions and the kurtosis is increasing in the systematic risk proportion.
In BKM (2003), the level and slope of the implied volatility curve have been found to be related to the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. Our results suggest that the level and slope of the implied volatility curve and the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis are all influenced by the systematic risk proportion.
As for the channels through which the risk factors enter into the option price structure, different models postulate specific mechanisms. For instance, , through examining delta-hedge gains/losses, found conclusively that there is a negative risk premium for market volatility. A negative volatility risk premium would increase the drift of the risk-neutral volatility, which could explain the observed higher implied volatility relative to its physical counterpart. On the other hand, jump risks, when priced by the market, enter the risk-neutral density via the third and fourth moments. As pointed out by , in a typical jump-diffusion setting, the jump size governs the risk-neutral skew while the jump intensity governs the risk-neutral kurtosis. A fear of market crashes would lead to a negative skew. Based on the results in BKM (2003), the more negatively skewed the risk-neutral distribution, the steeper the implied volatility curve. 4 In a recent study, Bakshi and Madan (2006) theoretically showed how and when the riskneutral and physical index volatilities can be different. Within their framework, the riskneutral volatility is higher than its physical counterpart when investors are risk-averse and when the physical distribution is negatively skewed and leptokurtic. Therefore, combining this result with the finding in BKM (2003), it appears that a wider gap between the riskneutral and physical volatilities would also be accompanied by a steeper slope of the implied volatility curve. A casual comparison of the S&P 100 index with stocks in Table 1A certainly confirms this (a rough measure of the slope can be obtained by finding the difference between the implied volatilities of the two extreme moneyness buckets). It is seen that, when the systematic risk proportion is approaching one (i.e., b j → 1), the spread between the implied and historical volatilities is the largest, and the implied volatility slope is the steepest, as manifested by the S&P 100 index options; the opposite is generally true when the total risk is mostly idiosyncratic (i.e., b j → 0), as apparent in the stocks with lower systematic risk proportions.
Which factor has a bigger systematic risk component, the stochastic volatility or jumps? S&P 500 index option returns, and pointed to volatility risk and possibly jump risk.
In contrast to a continuous-time setup where the stochastic volatility or jumps exert their impact on option price structures through their risk premiums, the discrete-time GARCH setup requires only the risk premium of the underlying asset. As shown by Duan (1995) , when the physical GARCH process is converted to its risk-neutral counterpart, the risk-premium of the underlying asset does not vanish; instead, it enters into the volatility process. In this setting, the risk-neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis are all affected by the risk premium. Specifically, holding other parameters fixed, a bigger (positive) risk premium would lead to a higher volatility, a more negative skew and fatter tails under the risk-neutral measure. Therefore, under GARCH, when the risk premium is high, the higher implied volatility is a direct result, while the steeper slope of the implied volatility curve is through the more negative skew. Duan and Wei (2005) , by assuming a one-factor stochastic discount factor with the GARCH feature, derived an explicit link between the risk premium and the systematic risk proportion. Specifically, a higher systematic risk proportion leads to a higher risk premium. 
Summary and conclusions
The derivatives literature has established, among other things, the following empirical findings: 1) the risk-neutral return distribution departs from its physical counterpart (e.g., Our study is motivated by the above realization. While most of the existing studies focus on index options in uncovering the price structure across moneyness, we instead examine the price structure across individual equity options. We demonstrate empirically how the systematic risk affects equity option prices. Insofar as the wedge between the risk-neutral and physical distributions is driven by the premiums of the systematic risk factors, the systematic risk must be the factor that differentiates individual equity options in price structure.
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We show conclusively that option prices are indeed related to the proportion of systematic risk in the total risk. Controlling for the overall risk level, a higher amount of systematic risk leads to a higher level of implied volatility and a steeper implied volatility curve. The effect remains robust to various alternative estimations of the variables and specifications of the tests.
Our empirical results could be reconciled with several theoretical paradigms. For instance, in a continuous-time setting, a negative risk premium for the volatility risk (as documented by would lead to option prices such that the higher the systematic risk, the higher the implied volatility relative to the historical volatility; alternatively, in a discrete-time GARCH setting, a higher systematic risk would predict a higher implied volatility and steeper slope of the implied volatility curve.
Appendix A: Relating implied volatility to the systematic risk proportion
First, empirical evidence in the literature strongly indicates that the risk-neutral market return (manifested in, e.g., S&P 500 index options) is negatively skewed and leptokurtic. An individual stock's risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis are expected to be related to market return's counterparts with the systematic risk proportion serving as the linkage. To this end, assume a standard one-factor market model for stock j:
In addition to the usual assumptions for the factor model, we require ξ jt to be a normal random variable. This assumption allows us to relate explicitly the implied volatility to the systematic risk proportion and the moments of the market return's distribution. Note also that the systematic risk proportion is essentially the R 2 of the regression model (9).
Second, as in Theorem 3 in BKM (2003), we assume that the same factor model structure holds under the risk-neutral measure, except that α j may undergo a mean shift. Preserving the same structure ensures that R 2 remains unchanged under the risk-neutral measure, i.e., b (rn) j = b j (hereinafter, the superscript rn stands for "risk-neutral"). By part (a) of Theorem 3 in BKM (2003) and our normality assumption, we can relate stock j's skewness to the market's as follows:
One can also follow the same reasoning to relate stock j's kurtosis to its market counterpart:
Note that if the market return is normally distributed under the risk-neutral measure, then so is the stock return irrespective of the value for b j .
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Third, Theorem 4 of BKM (2003) shows that, for a given maturity, the Black-Scholes implied volatility is related to the stock's risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis in the following fashion:
where the coefficients q 1 , q 2 and q 3 are written explicitly as functions of the option's moneyness, K/S.
Finally, substituting the skewness and kurtosis in (10) and (11) into (12), we have
Appendix B: Calculation of the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis using option denote the τ -period stock return. Let V (t, τ ), W (t, τ ) and X(t, τ ) represent the fair value of payoffs R(t, τ ) 2 , R(t, τ ) 3 and R(t, τ ) 4 respectively. According to Theorem 1 of BKM (2003), the τ -period risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis can be expressed as
X(t, τ ),
In the above, C(t, τ , K) is the value of a call option with time to maturity τ and exercise price K, and P (t, τ , K) is the corresponding put option value. The integrals can be approximated in a straightforward fashion using options available on each day. Our implementation is similar to that of Dennis and Mayhew (2002) . Specifically, we use the trapezoidal approximation and require that there are at least two calls and two puts for each maturity. To illustrate, suppose there are J call options available for maturity τ at time t, then the first integral in W (t, τ ) can be approximated as
∆K 2 = K 2 − K 1 and so on. All the other integrals can be approximated in a similar fashion.
Appendix C: Data description
The option data used in this study are identical to those in BKM (2003) in-the-money calls (puts), the data set effectively covers the whole moneyness spectrum.
As in BKM (2003), the data are screened on three fronts: 1) we only retain options that have both bid and ask quotes; 2) we eliminate option prices that violate the arbitrage conditions (i.e., the option price must be smaller than the stock price, but larger than the stock price minus the present value of the exercise price and the dividends); and 3) we eliminate the deep out-of-the-money puts (i.e., K/S < 0.9) and calls (i.e., K/S > 1.1) and retain the moneyness range from 0.9 to 1.1. BKM (2003) cleansed the very short and very long maturity options, and retained only those with more than nine days and less than 120 days to expiration. In our study, we extend the cut-off for the longer maturity to 180 days.
(It turns out that the index option observations mostly concentrate in the maturity range shorter than 120 days. This is the main reason why BKM (2003) omitted maturities beyond 120 days. We decide to include the long-term range since all individual stocks have enough observations in this range.) In addition, since we use a four-week window for time-series 25 regressions, we set a lower cut-off of maturity to 20 days. Therefore, for our empirical study, we examine three maturity ranges: short-term, 20 -70 days; medium-term, 71 -120 days;
and long-term, 121 -180 days.
For each particular option, the implied volatility based on the Black-Scholes formula is available. BKM (2003) showed that these implied volatilities are close to their counterparts backed out from the binomial tree. In other words, the difference between the precise American-style implied volatilities and the European-style Black-Scholes volatilities is negligible. In our study, the implied volatility based on the Black-Scholes formula is used.
The daily stock prices, downloaded from www.finance.yahoo.com, are used to calculate historical volatilities and the proportion of systematic risk in the total risk. We use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the market portfolio. This table reports the average implied volatilities within each moneyness bucket under a particular maturity range for options on the S&P100 index and its 30 largest component stocks. The third last column of the table contains the average implied volatility for the entire sample, while the second last column contains the average historical volatility. The last column contains the average proportion of systematic variance in the total variance. This table summarizes the properties of five groups of individual stocks / index sorted by their systematic risk proportions. The properties are 1) the average implied volatility minus the average historical volatility, 2) the average slope of the implied volatility curves, 3) the average risk-neutral skewness and 4) the average risk-neutral kurtosis. The maturity ranges for shortterm, medium-term and long-term options are, respectively, 20 -70 days, 71 -120 days, and 121 -180 days. The heading "Overall" is for all maturities combined. Given the large magnitude of the S&P 100 index's systematic risk proportion, we put it in a separate group, the fifth quintile. The first quintile contains six stocks and the other three contain eight stocks each. To be consistent with the estimation procedures described in Section 2, we estimate the variables monthly. Thus, the sorting is also done monthly, and the average variables are calculated for each quintile. We then average the monthly quantities for each quintile. This table contains results for two univariate cross-sectional regressions under various sample constructions. In the first regression, the dependent variable is the volatility differential -the average difference between the implied volatility and the historical volatility -and the explanatory variable is the average systematic risk proportion, i.e., . Table 1A . The regressions are run for the entire sample first, which corresponds to the "Overall" case. We then run the regressions for each of the four moneyness buckets. Finally, we run the regressions for each of the three maturity ranges. For each particular sample construction, we run regressions either with or without the S&P 100 index. For each pair of numbers, the first is the R 2 , and the second is the t-value for the regression coefficient γ 1 (a negative t-value indicates that the regression coefficient is negative). The t-values in bold type are significant at the 10% level or higher for two-tail tests. The maturity ranges for short-term, medium-term and long-term are, respectively, 20 -70 days, 71 -120 days, and 121 -180 days. This table contains two-pass regression results for the level effect tests. In the first pass, for each stock, we regress the difference between the implied volatility and the historical volatility on moneyness for non-overlapping periods of one month (i.e., four weeks): . ) ( We thus obtain a monthly time-series of the intercept a 0 and the slope coefficient a 1 for all stocks including the S&P100 index. The moneyness variable is adjusted by the sample mean within the month so that the intercept a 0 is the average of the difference between the implied volatility and the historical volatility. In the second pass, we cross-sectionally regress the intercept on the systematic risk proportion, the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. This regression is done every month in three different forms: , This table contains two-pass regression results for the slope effect tests. In the first pass, for each stock, we regress the difference between the implied volatility and the historical volatility on moneyness for non-overlapping periods of one month (i.e., four weeks): . ) ( We thus obtain a monthly time-series of the intercept a 0 and the slope coefficient a 1 for all stocks including the S&P100 index. The moneyness variable is adjusted by the sample mean within the month so that the intercept a 0 is the average of the difference between the implied volatility and the historical volatility. In the second pass, we cross-sectionally regress the slope on the systematic risk proportion, the risk-neutral skewness and kurtosis. This regression is done every month in three different forms: , This table reports panel regression results controlling for firm-specific characteristics used by Dennis and Mayhew (2002) . The regression set-up is the same as in Table 5 , except that we exclude the index since we are controlling for firm-specific characteristics. For meaningful comparisons, we re-run the panel regression in Table 5 without the index and report the results under the heading "Without firm-specific characteristics". To conserve space, we only report the R 2 , the coefficient and t-value for the level effect (α 1 ) and the slope effect (β 1 ). We then run the panel regression with the three control variables: log of the daily trading volume of the underlying stock, log of the firm size (which is the product of the number of shares outstanding and the share price), and the leverage (which is the sum of long-term debt and the par value of the preferred stock divided by the said sum plus the market value of equity). The results are reported under the heading "With firm-specific characteristics: trading volume (γ 1 ), firm size (γ 2 ), and leverage (γ 3 )". The t-values in bold type are significant at the 10% level or higher for two-tailed tests. This table contains two-pass regression results for the level and slope effects using systematic risk estimates derived from the Fama-French factors. The testing procedures are otherwise the same as those in Tables 3 and 4 . Panel A corresponds to Table 3 and Panel B corresponds to Table 4 . In Tables 3 and 4 , the systematic risk is estimated by regressing the stock's returns on the market returns (S&P 500). Here, the systematic risk is estimated by regressing the stock's returns on the two Fama-French factors as well as on the market returns. To conserve space, we only report the regression coefficients, the t-values and the average R 2 . For brevity, we also omit the results for regressions whose explanatory variables are only the skewness and kurtosis. The t-values in bold type are significant at the 10% level or higher for two-tailed tests.
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